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ABSTRACT
Lee, Sun Gu, M.S., Department of Economics, Wright State University, 2008. An 
Analysis of the Influence of CEO Characteristics on Research and Development 
Expenditures in Large Corporations (2005 Data).
This study analyzes the influence exerted by CEO characteristics (specifically, 
CEO stockholding percentages and CEO age) on research and development (R&D) 
expenditures in large American corporations over the twenty year period from 1986 to 
2005. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market share 
concentrations, and making specific reference to two Schumpeterian hypotheses on the 
correlation between R&D and increases in firm size, this study establishes a positive 
linear relationship between the dependent variable, R&D expenditure, and the 
independent variables of CEO stockholding, CEO age, firm size, and market share. This 
study next describes the corporate and market conditions which promote the development 
of a positive linear relationship between CEO characteristics and R&D and concludes by 
identifying the point of high market concentration at which the prominence of R&D 
activity is superseded by expenditures for advertising.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction............................................................................................... 1
CEO Risk-Avoidance Motives and Their Effect on Research and 
Development............................................................................................. 3
Literature Review: Entrenchment of Interest vs. Convergence of 
Interest........................................................................................................7
Research and Development in the Context of Schumpterian 
Hypotheses............................................................................................... 12
II. Two Hypotheses....................................................................................... 18
III. Data and Methods.................................................................................... 22
Data Sources.........................................................................................22
Definitions: Dependent and Independent Variables...........................23
Methods of Analysis............................................................................24
Models.................................................................................................. 26
IV. Results.......................................................................................................27
V. Conclusion................................................................................................ 33
VI. Appendices................................................................................................37
Appendix A. -  Cross-sectional Data of Firms...................................37
Appendix B. -  Market Share and HHI in 2005.................................. 39
VII. References................................................................................................ 61
IV
LIST OF TABLES
1. Definitions of Variables............................................................................23
2. Descriptive Statistics................................................................................ 24
v
LIST OF FIGURES
1. A Relationship between Advertising and Market Concentration.......... 15
2. A Relationship between R&D and Market Concentration.....................16
3. A Trend in R&D from Oligopolistic to Monopolistic Market..............21
4. Optimal Age of CEOs.............................................................................. 29
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
For their instruction, thoughtful direction, and professional courtesy 
throughout each phase of my work on this project, I wish to express my gratitude 
to the following members of the faculty of the School of Graduate Studies at 
Wright State University:
Robert Premus, Ph.D.
Carol Wang, Ph.D.
Joseph Eisenhauer, Ph.D.
Leonard J. Kloft, Ph. D.
I also wish to thank my family and my friend, Alex In, for their patience and 
abiding support.
Sung Gu Lee
VII
This thesis assesses the extent to which research and development (R&D) 
expenditures in large American corporations over the past two decades are determined by 
and directly related to the three following operational and structural factors within the 
corporate environment:
1) The percentages of stocks which CEO’s hold in the companies they 
head (considered in relation to CEO age and tenure).
2) The growth in firm size and scale (measured in net sales) relative to the 
increase in a firm’s market concentration (measured by the Herfmdahl- 
Hirschman Index).
3) The supplanting of R&D expenditures by advertising expenditures as 
market dominance evolves past the oligopolistic level, at which point 
market dominance is shared by a few companies, to the monopolistic 
control of a given market by a single company.
By establishing a positive linear relationship between substantial CEO 
stockholdings and R&D expenditures (within a context inclusive of low to oligopolistic 
market concentrations), this thesis argues that this type of correlation results largely from 
the CEOs’ perception that they share a common interest in company growth and profit 
with external stockholders. This perception of the potential for shared benefit is identified
I. Introduction
1
as evidence of convergence of interest between CEO’s and stockholders. Conversely, 
entrenchment of CEO interest occurs when the CEO’s recognition of shared interest with 
stockholders is obscured by self-interest causing the CEO to avoid investment in R&D 
out of concern for protecting his or her personal assets in the company.
Pursuant to this argument, the shift from R&D to advertising (occurring as the 
monopolistic threshold is approached) is the result of the CEO’s realization that at this 
point advertising has a more proven utility for profit generation than R&D. Therefore, the 
supplanting of R&D by advertising at the monopolistic level is an extension of 
convergence thinking, not a departure from it, because the benefits of profit generation 
continue to accrue to CEO’s and stockholders alike as total market dominance is reached.
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CEO Risk-Avoidance Motives and Their Effect on R&D
As the preeminent corporate insiders, CEO’s of large corporations possess a 
complete range of detailed information on the daily operations, long-range goals, and 
overall financial status and prospects of the corporate entities they direct. Inherently, their 
intimate access to vital financial data is both impetus and resource for effective and 
profitable managerial decisions. An ethical pitfall occurs, however, in the familiar case of 
CEO’s whose personal assets consist largely of substantial stockholdings in their own 
companies. Having unlimited financial data at their fingertips, CEO’s in this category 
often tend to disregard corporate growth in favor of protecting their own investments by 
reducing or limiting expenditures for R&D projects which have a discemable risk 
potential. As usually formulated, this risk-avoidance tendency among CEO’s with 
substantial stockholdings in their own companies can only be understood as a function of 
the CEO’s reprehensible and unethical self-interest.
As a business strategy, spending money on R&D poses a high degree of 
risk for large corporations, or for a firm of any size. CEO’s with large stockholdings, 
particularly those of advanced age (60 years and older) and therefore close to retirement, 
could be inclined to decentralize their financial risks and be motivated by inordinate 
fiscal cautiousness. Accordingly (as the theory goes), high stockholding CEO’s who are
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close to retirement age and who, by virtue of their position in the company, possess 
preemptive knowledge and decision-making authority, could tend to invest less robustly 
and less frequently in R&D projects, particularly those which seem likely to jeopardize 
the CEO’s personal assets in the company.
This tendency of CEO’s to avoid or radically curtail R&D projects in order to
safeguard their personal assets is usually attributed to the following three risk-avoidance
1 0 motives: 1) Risk-reduction Motive , 2) Shirking Motive , and 3) Short-term Focus
Motive3. Each of these motives reflects the general CEO tendency cited above to avoid
projects which could threaten their own financial interests to the potential detriment of
corporate profitability. On this basis, these motives are grouped within the general
category of CEO risk-avoidance.
Risk-reduction Motive
The risk-reduction motive pertains in particular to a CEO’s treatment of R&D 
projects in the mid to high-risk range. The term reflects intransigence on the part of the 
CEO regarding any project which, based upon precedent and a compelling supportive 
data, does not guarantee or even strongly indicate a high profit result. In essence, 
perception of even a moderate degree of risk for the corporation is construed as a 
prohibitive risk of personal loss for the CEO. The CEO’s reaction to this perception is to
1 Amihud, Y. and Lev, B. 1981. “Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers” The
Bell Journal o f  Economics, 12:2, pp. 605-617.
2 Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. 1972 “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization ” The 
American Economic Review, 62:5, pp. 777-795.
3 Narayanan, M. P. 1985. “Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results” The Journal o f  Finance, 5:5, pp.
1469- 1484.
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reject projects on the basis of a single criterion (i.e., risk of loss to himself) with the result 
that many projects in the reasonable risk category are not given judicious consideration.
Shirking Motive
The shirking motive impugns the risk-avoiding CEO with the moral failing of 
shirking the responsibility to implement, or perhaps even to fairly consider, R&D projects 
which by objective standards show at least the potential to alleviate a financial crisis or 
otherwise strengthen the company’s status in areas of critical or urgent need. An extreme 
example of this general pattern is the case of CEO’s who, in an abysmal act of self- 
regard, withhold approval of R&D projects even in the absence of a high-risk potential, 
solely because their contracts would not reward them directly for the project’s success.
Short-term Focus Motive
The short-run or short-term focus motive is essentially a restrictive, self-imposed 
myopia. It describes the tendency of the self-protective CEO to approve only those R&D 
projects which convincingly demonstrate a maximum potential for profit generation 
within a short interval (and usually while providing a direct contribution to the CEO’s 
assets.) Within this framework, only those R&D projects which show minimal risk 
potential to the CEO’s stockholdings, as well as the least interval between expenditure 
and personal reward to the CEO, are likely to be considered.
The theory of CEO risk avoidance is underscored interestingly by Peter (2005) 
who contends that older CEO’s use clever coping-strategies to compensate for 
shortcomings associated with age -shortcomings such as diminished mental acuity and
5
emotional assuredness.4 These strategies might include the optimizing of increased verbal 
skills which are said to accompany maturity. For example, although memory gradually 
declines after the age of twenty, vocabulary and verbal skills are enhanced. The 
augmented verbal skills of older CEOs, reinforced by their years of practical experience, 
may be effective means of facilitating and disguising avoidance of R&D projects.
Viewed within the context of these three risk-avoidance motives, the CEO profile 
which emerges is a complex of unrestricted authority, narrowness, and greed. The 
intrinsic asymmetry which exists between the CEO and external stockholders in terms of 
investment and authority could therefore cause stockholders to suffer the adverse 
consequences of decisions made by the aging, tenured CEO. If, motivated by self- 
interest, a CEO avoids investing energetically in R&D projects which show the potential 
to enhance stock value and corporate profit, he or she plainly impairs company growth in 
order to protect personal interests.
4 Peter, C. 2005. “Old. Smart. Productive. Surprise! The Graying of the Workforce is Better News than You 
Think” Business Week, pp. 78-86
6
Literature Review: Entrenchment of Interest vs. Convergence of Interest
The actual practices of older, large stockholding CEO’s with regard to their 
company’s R&D expenditures are usually assessed within the context of two differing 
hypotheses:
1) Entrenchment of CEO Interest Hypothesis; and
2) Convergence of CEO Interest Hypothesis.
The entrenchment of interest hypothesis states that substantial CEO stockholding 
widens the disparity between CEO and stockholder interests with a deadening effect on 
R&D. Further, the entrenchment hypothesis asserts that, dominated by their desire to 
protect and maximize their substantial stockholdings, CEO’s either refuse to, or lose the 
capability to, recognize their common bond with external stockholders and can even 
begin to regard stockholders’ interests as inimical to their own interests. Entrenched 
within this restricted purview, CEO’s succumb to self-interest causing one or all of the 
aforementioned trio of risk-avoidance motives to become operative. As a result, R&D is 
relegated to occupying an entrenched position on the corporate back burner. This point of 
view is argued notably by Dechow and Sloan (1991)5. They assert that, driven by self- 
interest, CEO’s with large stockholding percentages not only invest less in R&D in
5 Dechow, P. and Sloan, R. 1991. “Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem: An Empirical 
Investigation” Journal o f Accounting and Economics, V ol.14, pp. 51-89.
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general, but also will demonstrate greater aversion to R&D projects as they approach 
their final years in the company.
The opposing view, the convergence of interest hypothesis, contends that large 
CEO stockholdings actually reduce and can even nullify apparent disparities between 
CEO and stockholder interests resulting in increased, rather than reduced, implementation 
of R&D projects. The convergence hypothesis is a function of the CEOs’ enlightened 
perception that they and the stockholders are part of the same corporate entity. CEO’s 
with substantial investment in their companies will be likely to recognize that the 
corporation’s growth benefits them and the stockholders simultaneously and mutually. 
Therefore, increases in CEO stockholding percentages increase the possibility of a 
convergence of interest between CEO’s and stockholders.
This hypothesis is also endorsed by Jensen and Meckling (1976)6 who argue that 
a CEOs’ recognition of fundamental corporate solidarity prompts them to be more open 
to longer-range R&D projects which demonstrate the potential to be profitable for them 
and the stockholders alike, as opposed to favoring only shorter term projects which 
promise both quicker profitability and less risk of personal loss. Support for Jensen and 
Meckling’s viewpoint is offered by Cho (1992)7 and Francis and Smith(1995)8. Cho 
offers evidence that as a CEO’s stock share increases, expenditures for R&D increase
6 Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure” Journal o f Financial Economics, Vol.3, pp. 305-360.
7 Cho, S. 1992. “Agency Costs, Management Stockholding, and Research and Development Expenditures” 
Seoul Journal o f  Economics, Vol.5, pp. 127-152.
8 Francis, J. and Smith, A. 1995. “Agency Costs and Innovation: Some Empirical Evidence” Journal o f  
Accounting and Economics, V ol.19, pp. 383-409.
proportionally. Francis and Smith argue that in “closely-held” firms in which the CEO 
owns at least 30 per cent of the voting stock, or in which the CEO’s group owns at least 
20 per cent of the voting stock, a higher level of R&D projects are implemented than in 
their more “diffusedly-held” counterparts.
Demetz and Lehn (1985) 9 offer support of more general nature for the 
convergence hypothesis arguing that the structure of a firm’s ownership, more than the 
percentage of CEO stockholding, is the principal factor determining how the benefits of a 
given enterprise will be distributed among executives and general stockholders. They, 
however, assert also that high CEO stockholdings exert a positive influence on financial 
earning rates, the benefits of which necessarily accrue to both CEO’s and stockholders. 
Again, Demetz (1983)10, in concurrence with Fama and Jensen (1983)11, argues that 
increases in CEO stockholding percentages to high levels enhance an enterprise’s overall 
value.
Hill and Snell (1989)12 put forth a differing and more neutral point of view. They 
contend that considered on a per employee basis no statistically significant relationship 
exists between CEO stockholding percentages and R&D expenditures. In the same vein, 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)13, in their examination of the relationship between 
CEO stockholding and discretionary power of management within large corporations,
9 Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. 1985. “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences” 
Journal o f Political Economy, Vol.93, pp. 1155-1177.
10 Demsetz, H. 1983. “The Structure of Ownership and the Theory o f Firm” Journal o f Law and 
Economics, Vol.26, pp. 375-390.
11 Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. 1983. “Separation of Ownership and Control” Journal o f Law and 
Economics, Vol.26, pp. 301-325.
12 Hill, C. W. L. and Snell, S. A. 1989. “Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate 
Productivity” Academy o f Management Journal, Vol.32, pp. 25-46.
13 Morck, R. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 1988 “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An 
Empirical Analysis” Journal o f Financial Economics, Vol.20, pp. 293-315.
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disavow a precise linear relationship between these two factors. They conclude that high 
percentages of CEO stockholding do not lead necessarily to either conversion or 
entrenchment of interest. According to Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny, the discretionary 
powers of management which CEO’s exercise, and which prominently include R&D 
decisions, are determined by variable CEO characteristics such as age and tenure which 
exert their influence independent of CEO stockholding percentages.
While it might seem plausible that low CEO stockholdings favor convergence of 
interest with stockholders, and conversely that high levels favor entrenchment, the 
literature cited above presents a range of diverse opinion and argues that a number of 
factors other than risk-avoidance driven by self-interest be taken into account in the 
assessment of the factors affecting CEO attitudes toward R&D. These studies either 
tacitly question or directly argue against the contention that the three risk-avoidance 
motives already discussed (i.e., risk reduction, shirking, and short-term focus) 
unavoidably or even necessarily cause CEO entrenchment of interest leading to the 
curtailing of R&D expenditures. Considered collectively, these studies prompt similar 
and related questions: Can high CEO stockholdings coexist with and/or effectively 
promote a productive CEO identification with the interests of external stockholders? In 
what ways could such a potential for convergence of interest increase the potential for 
greater corporate profit and long-range viability through investment in R&D?
To address these questions, this study next considers the correlation between CEO 
stockholdings and the percentages of both R&D and advertising expenditures. This
10
correlation is considered within the context of three main factors: 1) increase in firm size;
2) variations in market concentration; and 3) the transformational trend in the national 
corporate environment from oligopolistic to monopolistic structures. The frame of 
reference within which these three factors is examined is provided by two familiar 
Schumpeterian hypotheses which state that increases in firm size and in market 
concentration are accompanied by increases in R&D expenditures.
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Research and Development in the Context of Schumpeterian Hypotheses
Two studies (cited below) which examine recent increases in R&D expenditures 
in large American corporations indicate a correlation between R&D increases and two 
closely related factors:
1) increase in firm size; and
2) increase in a firm’s market concentration.
Scherer(1965)14 affirms that growth in firm size and market concentration are positively 
linked to R&D expenditures. Thirty years later, Scherer’s findings were confirmed by 
Blundell, Griffith, and Reenen (1995)15.
Further, each of these studies corroborates two interrelated Schumpeterian 
hypotheses as follows: 1) Increases in a firm’s scale and size are accompanied by 
increases in R&D expenditures and activities; and 2) Increases in size and scale which 
also stimulate intensification of market concentration result in an even greater increase in 
R&D activity. These two Schumpeterian hypotheses also assert that the aforementioned
14 Scherer, F. M. 1965 “Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and the Output of Patented Innovations” 
American Economic Review, Vol.55, pp. 1097-1125.
15 Blundell, R. Griffith, R. and Reenen, J. V. 1995. “Dynamic Count Data Models o f Technological 
Innovation” The Economic Journal Vol. 105, pp. 333-344.
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increase in R&D generates an expansion of the firm’s efforts in technological 
innovation16 as a significant component of the invigorated R&D activity.
Each of these hypotheses is further corroborated by two separate studies: Cohen 
and Levin (1989)17 and Symeonidis (1996)18. These studies also contend, however, that 
the long-standing Schumpeterian-based view of R&D activities needs to be reevaluated 
in light of the ongoing structural evolution within corporate America toward oligopolistic 
conglomerates and monopolies. Driven to overcome the uncertainty, high costs, and risks 
inherent in highly competitive markets, more and more oligopolistic partnerships 
continue to emerge in corporate America. Reducing and in some cases eliminating 
competition by means of monopolistic-type controls, oligopolistic partnerships acquire 
dominantly high market concentrations which increasingly approached total market 
dominance.
Analyzing the increasing proportion of high market concentrations produced by 
oligopolistic partnerships, studies such as those by Cohen and Levin and Symeonidis
16 When a market becomes unstable, larger corporations can turnover more capital into R&D than smaller 
firms. As a result, larger firms which possess huge sales are better able to distribute their funds , derived 
from fixed costs, into technological innovation.
Moreover, large oligopolistic corporations can better predict the market due to their dominance, and based
on their predictions, generate larger profits which can be used for technological
innovation.
17 Cohen, W. M. and Levin, R, C. 1989. “Empirical Studies o f Innovation and Market Structure” in 
Schmalensee, R. and Willing, R. eds., Handbook o f Industrial Organization, Vol.2, pp. 1059-1107.
18 Symeonidis, G, 1996, “Innovation, Firm Size and Market Structure: Schumpeterian Hypotheses and 
Some New Themes” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 161.
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show that these high market concentrations are due less to R&D than to a range of 
marketing strategies. Specifically, advertising strategies such as television ads, mall and 
billboard displays, and conspicuous logos on clothing and other products are pervasively 
present in everyday life, as well as being readily understood by consumers in every part 
of the country from urban to rural locales. Consequently, within the emergent 
oligopolistic structure, high market concentrations enjoyed by major firms have caused 
brand name recognition to be a potent influence on consumer behavior, thus reducing 
both the need for and the effectiveness of R&D. As higher and greater market 
concentrations are reached, expenditures for advertising are effectively replacing R&D 
expenditures, thereby challenging the Schumpeterian hypothesis cited above that increase 
in firm size and market concentration are principally a function of R&D activities.
In their recent analysis of the impact of advertising in the oligopolistic 
environment, Pepall, Richards, and Norman(2005) demonstrate that high market 
concentrations are achieved by the power of advertising due to the commanding influence 
exerted by brand names. They assert that “the monopoly power associated with highly 
concentrated industries that generate advertising expenditures cause concentration to be 
high.” 19
Another significant effect of the reliance on advertising in the growing trend
90toward oligopolistic market structures was suggested by Telser(1964) . Firms with low
19 Pepall, L. Richards, D. J. and Norman, G. 2005. “Advertising, Competition, and Brand Names”
Industrial Organization Contemporary Theory & Practice; third edition, pp. 550.
20 Telser, L. 1964 “Advertising and Competition” Journal o f  Political Economy, Vol.72, pp. 537-562.
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market concentrations often have high advertising expenditures relative to R&D. These 
firms in this category, recognizing the need to remain competitive with the dominant 
oligopolistic firms, increase advertising expenditures as an effective means of increasing 
their level of market concentration. Thus, the dominance of oligopolistic firms with high 
market concentrations creates a growing widespread need for companies need to achieve 
higher and higher market concentrations. As a result, a national corporate pattern 
emerges favoring advertising over R&D.
Figure 1 below illustrates the general pattern of parallel increases in advertising 
expenditures and market concentrations which occurs as the corporate trend continues to 
evolve from oligopoly toward monopoly.
Figure 1: Relationship Between Advertising and Market Concentration
+
Increasing Advertising 
Expenditures
+
(Oligopoly................ -> Monopoly)
Increasing Market Concentration (HHI)
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Figure 2 below illustrates the general pattern of decline in R&D expenditures, 
which occurs in firms with established high market concentrations (HF1I) as the corporate 
trend continues to evolve from oligopoly toward monopoly.
Figure 2: Relationship Between R&D and Market Concentration
+
Declining 
R&D Expenditures
+
(O ligopoly - ........................Monopoly)
Increasing Market Concentration (HHI)
A reexamination of the Schumpeterian hypothesis required by the oligopolistic 
transformation indicates first, the effectiveness of advertising as market concentrations 
intensify; and second, that as the current corporate environment trends more and more 
toward oligopoly, R&D is not as likely to increase in unison with firm size and market 
concentration.
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The current trend in the corporate environment is comprised of increasing 
oligopolistic market dominance evolving toward monopolistic market dominance. This 
trend reveals that, contrary to the Schumpeterian hypotheses, R&D is less likely to 
increase as market concentrations intensify and instead is more likely to be replaced by 
the proven effectiveness of advertising in the current corporate climate. One obvious and 
basic reason for this change in emphasis is simply that the more a high-concentration 
company spends on advertising, the less revenue is available for R&D. At the same time, 
as Pepall, Richards, and Norman (2005) have established, a more substantive reason for 
the conspicuous de-emphasis on R&D in recent decades is the effectiveness of 
advertising in achieving and maintaining dominance in the oligopolistic marketplace.
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II. TWO HYPOTHESES
The research and opinion surveyed thus far provide a framework to determine 
how R&D expenditures are used to measure convergence of interest between CEO’s and 
external stockholders. More specifically, this information defines the effect which such a 
convergence of interest has on R&D expenditures in corporate markets with different 
levels of industry concentration. This information will now be examined within the 
context of two major hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis I
An increase in CEO stockholdings within a company approaching 
oligopolistic status leads to a positive linear relationship between high 
stockholdings and a firm’s R&D expenditures.
Hypothesis II
As a firm’s market structure advances from oligopoly to monopoly, R&D 
expenditures decrease and are supplanted by a broad range of advertising 
expenditures.
18
The CEO risk-avoidance motives, identified in section I as functions of 
entrenchment of CEO interest, are viewed as a major impediment to R&D expenditures 
in large corporations. Several recent studies (cited above) which question the accuracy of 
this notion, point out that the CEO’s tendency to avoid the financial risks inherent in 
long-range R&D projects diminishes with the development of the following conditions:
1) the firm’s HHI expands, first achieving a major share of dominance in a given market, 
and then evolves from the oligopolistic level toward monopolistic dominance; and 2) the 
CEO’s stockholding increases concomitantly with these major increases in HHI.
When these points of growth in market concentration are reached, CEO 
entrenchment of interest gives way to a convergence of interest with external 
stockholders. As this occurs, the CEO’s entrenchment thinking is displaced by the CEO’s 
recognition of the common interest they share with stockholders in maximizing corporate 
growth and profitability. Viewed in this context, increase in firm size and market 
dominance induces CEO’s to value their unity with external stockholders and to act upon 
this perception by investing in R&D projects, which demonstrate the potential to promote 
corporate growth.
Further, with regard to R&D, the CEO who possesses high stockholdings in a 
firm with growing market share abandons the ‘what’s in it for meT risk-avoidance 
attitude for an attitude favoring R&D expenditures for projects, both long-term and short­
term, which show a measurable degree of profit potential for both himself and the 
stockholders (a ‘what’s in it for usTattitude). The incentive to invest robustly in R&D
19
results therefore from the CEO’s perception that the potential for his personal benefit is 
connected integrally with overall corporate profits and thus with the personal gain of the 
stockholders as well. The continuing increase of conglomerates in corporate America has 
resulted in a radical reduction if not elimination of competition. In companies enjoying 
monopoly, the CEO’s perception of shared interest with stockholders can generate a 
climate conducive to a strengthening of interest convergence between the two, rather than 
a furthering of CEO entrenchment.
In contrast to the aforementioned Schumpeterian hypothesis, the high, and 
(following the current trend) often maximized market concentration which oligopolistic 
and monopolistic firms achieve does not ensure increased R&D expenditures. Instead, 
when these high levels of market dominance are reached, advertising expenditures 
(usually of the “invisible” variety in the form of branding) take the place of revenue spent 
on R&D. In essence, by virtue of a sustained superiority in market position, 
conglomerates and monopolies enjoy a diminished need to invest in R&D in order to 
develop new high quality products. They choose instead to invest in familiar, high- 
recognition advertising venues confident that consumers will continue to respond 
vigorously to the images and concepts which are both familiar and ubiquitous in the 
media, malls, and retail chains which saturate the prevailing consumer monoculture.
At these high levels of market concentration, the risk avoidance motives 
responsible for CEO entrenchment and R&D reduction are therefore likely to be 
neutralized. Advertising expenditures in a monopolistic setting pose no substantial threat 
to the CEO’s stockholdings comparable to those posed by the uncertainties of R&D
20
projects. Contrary to Schumpeterian Hypothesis 2, R&D expenditures decrease rather 
than increase at the monopolistic level even though firm size and HHI are maximized. At 
this level, corporate profits are also maximized making advertising in established venues 
to a growing consumer monoculture both less risky and more effective, thus benefiting 
corporate principals and external stockholders alike.
Figure 3: A Trend in R&D from Oligopolistic to Monopolistic Market Status
Figure 3, below, describes the decline in R&D which occurs when low 
competition (oligopolistic) market concentrations develop into competition-free 
(monopolistic) market concentrations.
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III. Data and Methods
Data Sources
In this study, cross-sectional data from 44 firms representing a wide diversity of 
industries is chosen to represent current R&D trends in large American conglomerates. 
Each of the firms considered has the largest rate of market share in its respective market.
Market concentration data for this study is taken from the Market Share Report 
2007 for 2005. Data on the 44 firms is derived from the Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual (SIC) from 1420 to 7375 (Appendix A). Data on R&D expenditures and on net 
sales is derived from Thomson Research and Mergent Online.
Each firm’s annual report and proxy statement is used to obtain CEO 
stockholding percentages and CEO ages in 2005.
Table 1 (below) illustrates the relationship between the independent variable of 
R&D expenditure and the independent variables of CEO characteristics (stockholding 
and age), firm scale (net sales), and market share (HHI).
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Table 1: Dependent and Independent Variables
Variables Definitions
Dependent variable R&D expenditure Real R&D expenditure in firms
Independent
variables
CEO
characteristics
CEO stockholding Amount o f CEO’s stockholding
CEO age CEO’s age
Schumpeterian
hypothesis
Scale Net sales
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Definitions
Dependent Variable: R&D Expenditures
As indicated in Table 1, the dependent variable of R&D expenditure is a firm’s 
real, verifiable expenditure on research and development within a given time frame.
Independent Variables
As indicated in Table 1, the independent variables considered in this study include 
CEO stockholding (real amount share), CEO age, firm size (net sales), and market 
concentration (HHI).
The use of firm scale and HHI as independent variables is required for the 
analysis of the Schumpeterian hypotheses which define direct correlations between 
increases in scale, market share, and R&D (summarized above in section I.)
HHI determines a specific percentage of a market structure. Accordingly, if a firm 
provides all the output in a given market, the pure monopoly value of the HHI should be 
10,000. Since this method integrates the number of firms in a market and the discrepancy
23
in their sizes, this study uses HHI rather than other methods such as three firm 
concentration (CR3) and Lemer Index (LI).
Methods of Analysis
Table 2 (below) displays the type and level of observations -  minimum, 
maximum, mean, and standard deviation—used in this study to establish correlations 
between R&D expenditure and the independent variables of CEO age and stockholding, 
and firm scale and market concentration.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Name of Variables N Minimum M aximum Mean Std. D eviation
Dependent
Variable
R&D Expenditure
44 32,338 7,392,000,000 1,247,993,439.5 2,008,561,591.43
CEO stockholding
44 6,625 1,017,499,336 32,603,821.28 156,347,785.73
Independent
variables
CEO characteristics
CEO age
44 36 68 55.23 6.62224453
Schumpeterian
Scale
44 61,911,000 192,604,000,000 25,901,739,409.1 34,998,550,178.9
hypothesis
HHI
44 1,333 7,450 3204.95 1,589.12
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The sample size consists of 44 firms, and the average R&D expenditure is 
$1,247,993 dollars.
The average CEO stock-holding amount is 432,603,821. The average CEO age is 
55.23. The average scale is $25,901,739,409 dollars. The average HHI is 3,204.95. Based 
on this sample size (44), there is no need for concern about the assumption of normality 
because the degree of freedom (N-l) is over 40.
Based on a selection of 44 companies from 43 diverse industries, this study 
broadly selects data from the SIC code (from 1420 to 7300) which is reported by the 
Market Share Report 2007 for 2005. Since the sample firms are not selected from a 
limited number of industries, the observations have a broadly-based significance and 
application. Additionally, the firms selected have the most dominant market share in their 
respective markets, making them representative of large-sized corporations.
Finally, this study uses two semi log-level models (below) to examine correlations 
between R&D and each of the independent variables cited. (In order to demonstrate an 
integrated representation of all four of the factors affecting R&D, semi log-level models 
are used here as an alternative to log-level models.)
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Models
Model 1 describes a nonlinear relationship between a dependent variable (R&D 
expenditure) and independent variables (CEO stockholding and age; firm scale (net sales 
growth); and market share (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)).
\og(R&D expenditure) = Bo + fiiCEOstockholding + pjCEOstockholdingsquare +
fECEOage + ftjCEOagesquare + [E Scale + (J> [Scalesquare + 
[RHH1 + P4HHIsquare + u
Model 2 describes a linear relationship between a dependent variable (R&D 
expenditure) and independent variables (CEO stockholding and age; firm scale (net sales 
growth); and market share (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)).
\og(R&D expenditure) = po + fECEOstockholding + (ECEOage + /??Scale + [EHEII + u
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IV. Results
Model 1, below, specifies the non-linear relationship between the dependent 
variable of R&D expenditures and the four independent variables cited above (all shown 
here to have a 60% variability).
Model 1
Log (R&D expenditure) = -  3.494 + 1356CEOstockholding-  \A50CEOstockholdingsquare 
T-statistic [-0.261] [1.324] [-1.092]
+ OJ19CEOage — O.Q06CEOagesquare + 7.816Scale 
T-statistic [1.552] [-1.312] [4.089]***
— 2.803Seal e square —  0.002H H I  + 2.133 HHIsquare 
T-statistic [-2.496]** [-1.893]* [1.718]*
Number o f observations = 44 
R-square = 0.601 
Adjusted R-square = 0.509 
Durbin-Watson = 1.808
* * * p  < .001 
**p< .002
* p <m
Significant components within this model are first, the aforementioned
independent variables, all of which have positive signs; and, second, the square of each 
variable, all of which having negative signs.
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As established previously (in section II, above), due to the complexities of various 
closely related risk-avoidance motives, CEO stockholding and CEO age show diverse 
degrees of correlation with R&D. Model 1 (above) identifies the robust R&D investment 
of CEO’s possessing a low amount of stocks as being consistent with the conduct of firm 
owners with high stockholdings; both utilize aggressive R&D activities as a way of 
increasing corporate profits as well as their personal assets. Further, the model indicates 
the converse correlation between passive investment in R&D and high levels of CEO 
stockholding (especially in the CEO’s later years) as emerging from the desire to reduce 
risk to existing holdings.
Thus, Model 1 provides corroboration for the 1991 findings of Dechow and 
Sloan, cited above in section I, which indicate that risk-avoidance motives exert a 
limiting influence on R&D among older CEOs who have increased stockholdings. At the 
same time, the overall pattern delineated in Model 1 confirms both the hypothesis of 
convergence of managerial interest with stockholders and the hypothesis of entrenchment 
of managerial interest as being relative to and contingent upon differing CEO 
stockholding levels.
Figure 4, below, shows that CEO age (+sign) and the square of CEO age (- sign) 
have a non-linear relationship with R&D expenditures in the model. This study identifies 
65 as the approximate turnaround point at which CEO interest and investment in R&D 
begin to decrease. More specifically, CEO’s from 36 to 65 tend to invest aggressively in 
R&D, while CEOs from 65 to 68 tend to decrease their investments
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Figure 4: Optimal Age of CEOs
10.779 / (2 * -0.006)| = 64.916666 ~ 65
In addition, Model 1 shows firm scale as having a positive sign and firm scale 
squared as having a negative sign, thus establishing a non-linear relationship between the 
two independent variables and R&D. Briefly, the model shows that firms with either low 
or high firm scale have low R&D expenditure and firms of middle scale have high levels 
of R&D expenditure.
With regard to the Schumpeterian hypothesis which states that increases in both 
firm scale and size are accompanied by an increase in R&D activity, the data in Model 1 
both supports and contradicts the hypothesis as follows: Firms with low net sales and 
increased R&D expenditures confirm Schumpeter, while firms which have mid-range net 
sales and which are also endeavoring to decrease R&D, disprove Schumpeter. Lastly, in 
Model 1 market concentration (HHI) shows a negative sign and the square of HF1I shows 
a positive sign, thus implying a non-linear relationship between HHI and R&D. This 
aspect of the data is particularly relevant to the de-emphasis on R&D which occurs as 
oligopolistic market concentrations evolve toward the monopolistic level.
In essence, Model 1 helps to make clear that R&D activities increase when their 
effectiveness as competitive business tools increases. This is most likely to occur in
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intensely competitive markets in which a few high market concentration firms vie for 
supremacy and continues until the conditions of oligopoly are securely established within 
the dominance of a limited number of conglomerates. At this point, R&D activities 
decline and are replaced by other profitable and less costly marketing strategies, 
particularly advertising. This study, therefore, adds support to the findings of Scherer 
(1965), Van Reenen (1995), Cohen and Levin (1989), and Symeonidis (1996), (all 
basically in line with the two Schumpeterian hypotheses discussed above in section I). In 
addition, and as already noted, this study also identifies the point of oligopolistic market 
dominance at which considerable more revenue is directed toward advertising.
In contrast to Model 1, Model 2 shows 1) a positive relationship between R&D 
and the variables of CEO stockholding, CEO age, and financial scale; and 2) a negative 
relationship between R&D and HHI.
Model 2
Log (R&D expenditure) = 14.193 + A.95%CEOstockholding + 0.09\CEOage 
T-statistic [5.181]*** [2.415]** [2.016]*
+ 3.837Scale -O.OOOHHI 
T-statistic [4.475]*** [-1.699]*
Number of observations = 44 
R-square = 0.464 
Adjusted R-square = 0.409 
Durbin-Watson = 1.573
* * *  p < .001 
* * p < .  002 
* p <  .01
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The independent variables included in Model 2 show a 46% variability as 
opposed to the 60% variability in Model 1; both are, however, functions of disparities in 
R&D. Furthermore, even though the R square in Model 2 (0.464) is lower than that of 
Model 1 (0.601), Model 2 integrates all four significant variables -  CEO stockholding, 
CEO age, market concentration, and HHI.
More specifically, Model 2 shows a positive relationship between the amount of 
CEO stock and R&D expenditure, i.e., a correlated increase in CEO stockholding and 
R&D expenditure. Model 2 also indicates a positive relationship between CEO age and 
R&D and thereby supports the argument that older CEO’s will tend to invest more 
aggressively in R&D than their younger counterparts, thus confirming the 1988 findings 
of Morck, Schliefer, and Vishny cited above in section I.
The basic Schumpeterian hypothesis of a positive relationship between firm scale 
and R&D is established in Model 2 at the 1% level of significance. The data therefore 
provides a broad confirmation that, all other factors being equal, the largest corporations 
invest more aggressively in R&D than smaller companies. The model also illustrates that 
R&D expenditures and market concentrations are statistically significant at the 10% 
level, which is low in comparison to the relationship between scale and R&D.
More precisely, the relationship between market concentration and R&D is shown 
to have a negative sign, thereby contradicting the Schumpeterian hypotheses in this one
31
particular respect: While in today’s corporate climate, the increasing number of 
oligopolistic firms with lower market concentrations (relative to monopolistic firms) tend 
to increase the money they spend on R&D, a reduction of R&D expenditures usually 
accompanies the maximizing of market concentrations as the level of monopolistic 
dominance is approached.
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V. Conclusion
The data presented in the preceding discussion are intended to delineate the 
conditions under which a particular set of independent variables will affect, either 
positively or negatively, the underlying policies governing the dependent variable of 
R&D expenditures. The principal independent variables considered are as follows:
1) the CEO characteristics of stockholding percentages and age; and
2) the two major firm characteristics of firm scale measured in net sales and firm 
market concentration measured as HHI.
From within this framework, two major conclusions are reached about the effect 
which these independent variables have upon R&D expenditures in large corporations. 
First, CEO stockholding, CEO age (relative to retirement), and firm scale all have a 
positive linear relationship with R&D, particularly when the firm is in a competitive 
market and is attempting to increase or maximize its hold on a larger market share.
R&D’s proven effectiveness in enhancing firm performance and generating greater 
profits motivates CEO’s not only to increase R&D expenditures, but also to continue to 
increase their personal stockholdings in the company. Recognition of the obvious benefit 
of increasing personal ownership in an increasingly more profitable company ensures that 
higher CEO stock-holding and greater R&D expenditure continue to go hand-in-hand.
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This endogenous, positive linear relationship is operable in a firm’s growth until it 
reaches oligopolistic market share and scale. Moreover, until this level is reached, the 
resultant investment in R&D reflects recognition on the CEO’s part of the mutuality, or 
convergence, of financial interest between himself and stockholders and thereby 
strengthens the CEO’s willingness to accept measurable risks inherent in the R&D 
projects under consideration.
Second, the deviation from this pattern occurs when HE1I, or high market share 
concentrations, begin to have a negative linear relationship with R&D at the point of 
marked declines in competition. This point is reached when oligopoly evolves into 
monopoly and, as a consequence, R&D is displaced by well-proven modes of advertising 
as a means of maintaining market dominance. The possibility that this displacement 
might be due to cash flow shortages or related fiscal concerns is questionable in light of 
the high profitability achieved at the level of oligopoly. It seems more likely that the shift 
to advertising as the monopolistic market concentration is approached is due to its 
superior effectiveness at this level. Once a huge nation-wide, virtually ‘captive audience’ 
of consumers both familiar with and having ready access to the company’s product line is 
established, advertising generates higher sales and profits than R&D.
These conclusions, therefore, contradict the concept of CEO entrenchment of 
interest hypotheses which states that CEO stockholdings and proximity to retirement age 
cause CEO’s to deliberately and consistently obstruct R&D projects to safeguard their
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own assets. The shift from R&D to advertising which occurs at the higher levels of 
market dominance is more likely a matter of deliberate choice than either narrow self- 
interest or financial necessity.
As discussed in section I, the risk-reduction, shirking, and short-run CEO motives 
often are held to cause self-interested CEO’s to avoid or even impede R&D projects 
which could be vital to corporate growth. Model 2 delineates the plausibility of this type 
of negative linear relationship between CEO stockholding and R&D. The model shows 
further that this relationship could occur even when CEO stock levels are at a relatively 
low level and when the likelihood of financial loss due to ineffectual R&D projects is not 
pronounced. Moreover, it is frequently argued that CEO’s with high stockholdings are 
likely to safeguard their assets by investing in projects which have lower risk than R&D.
The general import of the conclusions reached in this thesis is that the data 
considered here argues against a negative concept of the self-protective, self-interested 
CEO. Instead, the data favors the view that CEO’s are more likely to rationally appraise 
the utility of R&D as a means of increasing sales and market share for the mutual benefit 
of the corporation as a whole. Until the turning point of monopolistic market control is 
reached, it is the CEO’s perception of increased profitability and long-range viability 
which motivates increased spending for R&D.
With regard to the market concentration factor, the data considered here 
demonstrate that both high and low concentrations lead to high levels of R&D activities 
while in firms with mid-range concentrations invest less robustly in R&D. Furthermore,
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the data argue that the negative influence of standard risk-avoidance motives are 
overcome due either to the urgent need to establish a market foothold in a competitive 
market (low HHI) or to the security and optimism inspired by commanding market share 
(high HHI).
Overall, increases in profits and stronger market position which accompany 
increase in firm size result in a predominantly positive linear relationship between CEO 
stockholding and R&D expenditures. This study therefore affirms the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis equating increase in firm size and R&D with the qualification that this 
relationship is interrupted at the point of transition from oligopolistic to monopolistic 
conditions. At this point, advertising expenditures take the place of R&D expenditures by 
virtue of their proven effectiveness in the conglomerate monomarket which has become 
the dominant pattern in corporate America.
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VI. Appendices
Appendix A. — Cross-Sectional Data of Firms
SIC
Code
NAICS
Classified industry catalogue Dominated company
1420 212312 Leading Stone Mining Firm Vulcan Materials
2013 311612 Top Bacon Maker Altria
2022 311513 Top Cheese Maker Kraft Foods
2032 311422 Top Soup Maker Campbell Soup
2038 311412 Top Frozen Dinner Maker ConAgra Foods, Inc.
2043 31123 Top Cereal Maker Kellogg
2066 31132,31133 Largest Chocolate Candy Maker Hershey
2520 337214 Leading Office Furniture Maker HNI
2631 32213 Top Bleached Paperboard Maker International Paper
2631 32213 Top Linerboard Maker Smurfit-Stone
2672 322222 Top Tape Maker 3M
2676 322291 Top Cleaning Cloth Maker Clorox Co.
2761 323116 Leading Pressure-Sensitive Material Maker Avery Dennison
2821 325211 Leading Polystyrene Marker Dow Chemical
2833 325411 Top Multivitamin Maker Wyeth Labs Inc.
2834 325412 Top Drug Maker Pfizer
2841 325611 Top Landry Detergent Maker Procter & Gamble
2844 32562 Top Toothpaste Maker Colgate Oral Pharmaceuticals
2844 32562 Top Baby Lotion Johnson & Johnson
2899 325998 Top Rug/Room Deodorizer Maker Church & Dwight
3011 326211 Highway Truck Tire Good Year
3229 327212 Leading Glass Container Maker Owens-Illinois
3261 327111 Plumbing Fixture AVX Corporation
3519 333618 Leading Marine Diesel Engine Maker Caterpillar
3571 334111 Top Computer Maker Dell
3631 335221 Top Appliance Maker Whirlpool
3711 336112 Top Light-Truck Vendor General Motors
3825 334514,334515 Leading Automatic Meter Maker Itron
3841 339112 Excessive Menstrual Bleeding Treatment Cytyc
3842 339113 Drug-Coated Stent Boston Scientific
3845 334510 Leading Pacemaker Firm Medtronic
3861 333315 Top Digital Camera Maker Kodak
3861 333315 Largest Color Copier Maker Xerox
3944 339932 Leading Game Publisher Electronic Arts
3944 339932 Leading Board Game Maker Hasbro
4724 56151 Leading Online Travel Firm Expedia
4822 51331 Online Postal Market Stamps.com
4822 51331 Top News Site Yahoo
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5231 44412 Leading Paint/Wallpaper Retailer Sherwin-Williams Co.
6211 52311 Leading Investment Banking Firm Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
7372 334611, 51121 Top Web Brower Microsoft
7373 541512 Top Server Makers in EMEA Hewlett-Packard
7375 514191 Leading IT Service Firms in the EMEA IBM
7812 51211 Top Documentary Firm Time Warner Inc.
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Appendix B. -  Market Share and HHI in 2005 
Vulcan Materials
Leading Stone Mining Firms, 2005
69%
12%
5%
□  Vulcan Materials
□  Martin Marietta Materials
□  Lafarge North America
□  O th e r
HHI = 5,126.00 
Altria
Top Bacon Makers, 2005
8 .00%  11.00%
□  Altria
□  Smithfield Foods
□  Hormel
□  Tyson
■  Private label
□  Other
HHI = 1,862.00
39
Kraft Foods
Top Cheese Makers, 2005
'O O O u
B Kraft Foods
■ Sargento Foods
□ Borden
□ Groupe Lactalis
■ Tillamook Country
□ Land O'Lakes
■ Private label
□ Other
H H I =  2,061.17  
Campbell Soup
Top Soup Makers, 2005
HHI = 3,074.55
□ Campbell Soup  
13 General Mills
□ ConAgra
□ Del Monte
■ CountryGourmet
□ Hain Celestial 
D Private label
□ Other
| : * f  :|:fi
!■■ i M-p; ■ p : W.
Ob
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ConAgra Foods, Inc.
T o p  F ro z e n  D in n e r  M a k e rs , 2 0 0 5
18.5%
50.6%
□  ConAgra Inc.
B  Pinnacle Foods Products Inc.
□  N estle  U S A  Inc.
□  M arie Callender's
■  H einz  Frozen Foods
□  O th e r
H H I =  3,230.56  
Kellogg
Top Cereal Makers, 2005
□ Kellogg
□ General Mills
□ Kraft Foods
□ Pepsico
■ Malt 0  Meal
□ Halt Celestial
□ Private label
□ Other
HHI =2,411.83
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Hershey
Largest C hocolate  C andy M akers, 2005
23%
HHI = 3,121.13 
HNI
Lead ing  O ffice  F u rn itu re  M akers, 2005
□  HNI
□ Steelcase Inc
□  Herm anMiller
□  Knoll 
■ Other
HHI = 2,971.10
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International Paper
T o p  B lea c h e d  P a p e rb o a rd  M a k ers , 2005
B International Paper
■ MeadWestvaco
□ Potlatch
□ Georgia-Pacific
■ Rock-Ten n 
(■Smurfit-Stone
E  Blue Ridge Paper
□ Weyerhaeuser
■ Tembec
■ Other
HHI = 1,944.88 
Smurfit-Stone
To p  L in erboard  M akers , 2005
o
B  Smurfit-Stone
■ Weyerhaeuser
□ International Paper
□  T e m p le -ls la n d
■ Georgia-Pacific
□ Packaging Corp. of America 
B Green Bay Packaging
□ Longview Fibre
■ Boise Cascade
■ Norampac
□ Other
HHI = 1,333.06
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3M
Top Tape Makers, 2005
□ 3M
■ Manco Inc.
□ Le Pages, Inc. Div
□ Tri-Pak Inds.
■ Private label
H H I =  6,562.98  
C lorox Co.
Top Cleaning Cloth firms, 2005
H Clorox
■ Lysol
□ Mr. Clean
□ Windex
■ Pledge
□ Glass Plus
□ Fantastik
□ Old English
■ Formular 409
■ Murphy's Oil
□ Other
HHI = 1,970.25
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Avery Dennison
Leading Preasure-Sensitive Material Makers, 2005
□ Avery Dennison 
B Bemis
□ UPM-Kymmene (Raflatac)
□ Other
12%
HHI = 3,464.00 
Dow Chemical
Leading Polystyrene Markers, 2005
12%
21%
HHI = 1,969.28
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Wyeth Labs Inc.
Top Multivitamin Makers, 2005
15.98%
22.06%
5.57% 711o/o 19.38%
□  W yeth Labs Inc.
■  B a ye r C onsum er Health Div
□  Knight M cDow ell Labs
□  Bausch & Lomb Inc.
■  Private label
□  O th e r
HHI= 1,969.42 
Pfizer
Top Drug M akers, 2005
□  Pfizer
□ GlaxoSmithKline
□ Johnson & Johnson
□  Merck & Co
■ AstraZeneca
□  Novartis
□ Sanofi-Aventis
□ Lilly
■ Bristol-Myers Squibb
□ Other
HHI = 2,640.98
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Procter & Gamble
Top Landry D etergent M akers, 2005
3% 2% 3%
10%
14%
□ Procter & Gamble
□ Unilever
□ Church & Dwight
□ Henkel 
■ Colgate
□ Private label
□ Other
H H I =  3,982.00
Colgate Oral Pharmaceuticals
Top Toothpaste Markers, 2005
30.4%
□ Colgate Oral Pharmaceuticals
□  Procter & Gamble
□  GlaxoSmithKline
□ Church & Dwight
■  Oral-B Laboratories
□  Other
HHI = 2,608.60
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Johnson & Johnson
Top Baby Lotion Makers, 2005
□ Johnson & Johnson
■ Aveeno
□ Johnson's Bedtime Lotion
□ Baby Magic 
HHuggies
□ Gerber Grins & Giggles
■ Burt's Bees
□ Gerber Teeny Faces
■ Gerber Teeny Bodies
□ Johnson's Baby
□ Private label 
m Other
HHI = 2510.33 
Church & Dwight
Top Rug/Room Deodorizer Makers, 2005
□ Church & Dwight
□ S.C. Johnson Son
□ WD 40 Company
□ Rug Doctor Inc
■ Personal Care Products Inc.
□ Private label
□ Other
HHI = 3,046.52
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Good Year
Highway Truck Tire Markers, 2005
1 7%
34%
17%
□ good year
■  M ic h e lin
□ Bridgestone
□ Firestone
■ General
□ Yokohama
□  O th e r
HHI = 2,137.00
Owens-Illinois
Leading Glass Container Maker, 2005
HHI = 3,198.00
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AVX Corporation
Leading Pottery/Ceramic/Plumbing Fixture Makers,
2005
10%
10%
□ AVX Corporation
□ American Standard 
□ARC International
□ Other
H H I =  4,752.00  
Caterpillar
Lead ing  M arin e  D iese l E ng in e  M akers , 2005
19%
11% 15%
□ Caterpillar
□ CMD
□ John Deere
□ Volvo Penta 
■ Yanmar
□ Other
HHI = 1,865.50
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Dell
Top Computer Makers, 2005
□ Dell
□ Hewlett-Packard
□ Gateway
□ Apple 
■ Toshiba
□ Lenovo
□ Other
H H I =  2,492.40  
Whirlpool
Top A ppliance M akers, 2005
□ Whirlpool
□ General Electric
□ Maytag
□ Other
HHI = 2,750.00
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General Motors
Top Light-Truck Vendors, 2005
0.74%
7.07%6J0! i i ^
10.98%
18.67% 23.75%
□ General Motors
□ Ford Motor
□ DaimlerChrysler
□ Toyota Motor Sales 
■ American Honda
□ Nissan North America
□ Hyundai-Kia Automotive
□ Mazda
H H I =  1,951.21 
Itron
Leading Autom atic M eter M akers, 2005
19%
13%
54%
□ Itron
□ Cellnet
□ ESCO
□ Hunt 
■ Other
HHI = 3,552.00
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Cvtvc
Excessive Menstrual Bleeding Treatm ents
12%
□ Cvtvc
■ Johnson & Johnson
□ Boston Scientific
□ Other
H H I =  3,526.00  
Boston Scientific
D u rg -C oated  S ten t M arket
41% .
- —
n  Boston Scientific
■  Johnson & Johnson
59%
HHI = 5,162.00
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Medtronic
Lead ing  P a c em a k er F irm s, 2005
3.34%
22.-;:-,%
□  Medtronic
■ St. Jude
□  Guidant
□  Other50.72%
H H I =  3,639.44  
Kodak
Top Digital Cam era Makers, 2005
13.8%
8 .6%
17.7%
17.7%
□ Kodak
□ Canon
□ Sony
□ Fujifilm 
■ Nikon
□ Olympus
□ Hewlett-Packard
□ Other
HHI = 1,490.38
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Xerox
Larg est C o lo r C o p ie r M akers, 2005
15%
11%
! 30%]
17%
27%
□ Xerox
■ Ricoh
□ Canon
□ Konica/Minolta
■ Other
HHI = 2,264.00 
Electronic Arts
Leading Game Publishers, 2005
□  Electronic Arts 
0  Activision
□ LucasArts
□  Nintendo
■ THQ
□ Sony Computer Entertainment
□ Take-Two Interactive
□ Konami
■ Microsoft
■ Vivendi
□  O ther
HHI = 1,387.72
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Hasbro
L e a d in g  B o a rd  G a m e  M a k e rs , 2 0 0 5
15%
10%
□ Hasbro
□ Mattel
□ Other
H H I =  5,950.00 
Expedia
Leading Online Travel Firms, 2005
7 .0% 0 .2%
22.2% □ Exnedia
47.0% □ Cendant
□ Sabre
□ Priceline 
■ Other
23.6%
HHI = 3,307.84
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Stamps.com
Online Postal Market, 2005
15%
n stamps.com 
■ Other
HHI = 7,450.00 
Yahoo
Top News Sites, 2005
□ Yahoo News
□ MSNBC
□ CNN 
□AOL News 
■ Gannett
□ Other
HHI = 2,145.43
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Sherwin-Williams Co.
P a in t a n d  W a llp a p e r  S to re s
□  S herw in-W illiam s Co.
■  P P G  In d u s tr ie s
□  ICI Paints in North A m erica
□  Professional Paint
■  O ther
HHI = 5,098.42 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
Lead ing  In ves tm en t B anking  F irm s, 2005
32.1%
4.7%
5.7% 5.9% 5.9% 6-5%
□  Goldman Sachs
□ Citigroup
□ Morgan Stanley
□  Merrill Lynch
■ Lehman Brothers
□ JPMorgan
□  Credit Suisse First Boston
□  UBS
■ Banc of America
□ Deutsche Bank
□ Other
HHI = 1,507.04
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Microsoft
Top Web Browers, 2005
□  Microsoft
□  Mozilla Foundation
□  Apple Computer
□  Netscape Communications Corporation
■  Opera
□  Other
HHI = 7,344.49 
Hewlett-Packard
Top Server Makers, 2005
9.8%
10.2%
31.6%
32.4%
□ Hewlett-Packard
□ IBM
□ Sun Microsystems
□ Fujitsu/Fujitsu Siemens 
■ Dell
□ Other
HHI = 2,378.05
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IBM
Lead ing  IT S erv ice  F irm s, 2005
□  IBM
■  A cce n tu re
□  Hew lett-Packard Services
□  T-System s
H C a p g e m in i
□  Atos Orgin
□  Other
H H I =  5,817.24  
Time Warner Inc.
Top Docum entary Firms, 2005
□ Warner
0 Param ount
□ Sony Pictures
□ Fox
■ Image Ent
□ Ventura
□ A&E
□ Lionsgate
■ Madacy Ent.
■ Other
HHI = 1,967.46
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